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Abstract: This paper gives an empirical assessment of the extent to which a financial 
crash in a country can slowdown the domestic economic growth and how these 
effects can spread through trade relationships. First, we modify the Cerra and 
Saxena's (2008) methodology in order to understand the interplay between economic 
activity and foreign trade during the 2008 financial crisis. Our sample is made of 
monthly data for 26 countries over 1993-2013. We then simulate the dynamic 
responses of domestic activity to a demand shock and to a financial crisis. Trade 
contributes to growth in the context of a demand shock (from 63% for developing 
countries to 433% for NAFTA) whereas it dampens output loss in the context of the 
2008 financial crisis (from -38% for developing countries to -127% for NAFTA). 
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I. Introduction 
The Great Financial crisis in 2008 looked to many people as an unprecedented event 
since World War II given its macroeconomic consequences on the real economy. It 
led to deep and protracted recessions in many advanced countries coupled with an 
impressive, though transitory, fall in international trade flows.  
According to the NBER business cycle dating for the US economy, the recession 
lasted eighteen months with a 15 percent decline of the US industrial production (Ng 
and Wright, 2013, for an extensive discussion). Moreover, cross-country business 
cycles were almost fully synchronized around the time of the Great Recession (Imbs, 
2010). The recovery of economic activity has been unusually sluggish: only 
Germany and the US (out of 12 countries having experienced a systemic banking 
failure) have reached their pre-crisis peaks in terms of per capita income since 2008 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, 2014). The resulting worldwide and severe drop in 
demand is seen by Baldwin and Taglioni (2009) as primarily responsible for what 
they termed “the great trade collapse”. A major implication is that domestic activity 
as well as foreign trade may recover rapidly as foreign demand strengthens.  
The aim of this article is precisely to analyze the extent to which cross-country trade 
linkages may have amplified or, instead, mitigated the decline of output caused by 
the global financial crisis in 2008. To this end, we study the post-crisis dynamics of 
real activity on the basis of monthly data on industrial production in 26 countries 
around the world. These include both developed and emerging countries, some being 
OECD members whereas the others are not, from January 1993 to June 2013.  
In this paper, we try to disentangle trade spillovers during the 2008 financial crisis. 
According to the literature, trade may dampens or magnify the effects of financial 
crisis. Following the methodology of Cerra and Saxena (2008), Bussière et al. 
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(2012), and Tsangarides (2012), we adopt a dynamic panel data approach. However, 
measuring the effect of trade spillovers from one country to its partners and vice 
versa requires extending this framework. Indeed, endogeneity problems may arise 
here since domestic activity in a given country can be affected by the growth path of 
its trading partners while, in turn, the latter can be influenced by the financial crisis at 
home. We thus build impulse response functions of economic activity to various 
shocks from a dynamic system. It allows assessing the role played by such cross-
border trade relationships. We compare the responses of economic activity to a 
financial crisis shock with those obtained following a fall in real demand. This is 
done for each of the 26 countries of the sample. Responses at the country level are 
then aggregated given regional trade or currency agreements. 
The article reaches two main conclusions. Firstly, a decline of output caused by 
negative demand shock is bigger for all 26 counties when bilateral trade relationships 
are taking into account for than otherwise. In particular, the contraction in industrial 
production is much larger in countries promoting trade than in those restraining 
trade, as pointed out by Abeysinghe and Forbes (2005). Secondly, positive trade 
spillover effects seem to have mitigated the fall in output caused by the global 
financial crisis for 24 out of 26 countries. This positive effect is consistent with the 
main findings of Cavallo and Frankel (2008). However, it is uncertain whether the 
contribution of foreign trade to output dynamics is positive or negative during 
financial crises. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the two-
way relationship between international trade and banking crises. Section 3 describes 
our econometric approach and the dataset. Section 4 discusses our main empirical 
findings. Section 5 concludes."  
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II. Literature review 
 
2.1. The effects of financial crises on trade 
 
Banking crises can affect trade flows through two main channels depending on their 
effects on the supply-side or on the demand-side. 
On the production side, a credit crunch is likely to occur as a consequence of distress 
and greater reluctance among financial intermediaries in the home economy. This 
reduces external financing available for the domestic firms. But the credit channel 
may be more pronounced for the trading sector because, compared with domestic-
oriented producers, foreign-oriented activities are often subject to greater risks (Love 
et al., 2007), higher sunk costs of entry (Campa, 2004), and more severe financial 
constraints (Manova et al., 2011). 
On the demand side, the post-crisis economic slump may translate into a collapse in 
the aggregate demand so that it deters import and/or export flows. To this regard, a 
given country can suffer from banking crises occurring abroad when they are 
followed by a substantial decline in import demand from its foreign trading partners. 
As economic growth slows down in the crisis-hit country, its demand for imports is 
likely to diminish. By contrast, its exports may either rise or fall depending on 
whether the banking crisis is twinned with a substantial depreciation or devaluation 
of the country’s currency.  
In a long-run perspective, Abiad et al. (2011b) build an augmented gravity model to 
study the impact of 179 financial crisis episodes over 1970-2009. They conclude that 
disruptions in financial systems are indeed associated with substantial collapses in 
imports in the crisis country. Imports are found to persistently fall short of their 
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gravity-predicted levels in the years following a financial crisis. Unlike imports, the 
reduction in exports is rather small in the crisis inception year and it quickly recovers 
to its pre-crisis level. This result is consistent with the negative influence of the lack 
of external financing on foreign trade performance when a banking crisis occurs. At 
the firm level, Amiti and Weinstein (2011) show how the Japanese exporters suffered 
from a major squeeze in credit by domestic banks during the 1990s. This is 
consistent with Rajan and Zingales’ (1998) argument according to which firms 
largely dependent on external finance suffer more from a credit squeeze than self-
financed activities. Deleveraging by distressed banks and export-oriented firms may 
well magnify the impact of troubled financial conditions on international trade flows. 
Consistently, there is growing empirical evidence pointing to the negative impact 
that the Great Financial Crisis had on bilateral trade flows. In the advanced 
economies with well-developed financial systems, the export sector might have been 
hurt by a big credit crunch as financial firms became illiquid or, worse, insolvent. 
This is shown by Chor and Manova (2012) who estimate that the increase in the costs 
of financing from September 2008 to August 2009 may have depressed US imports 
by as much as 5.5 percent. This is taken as evidence that countries with tighter credit 
conditions exported less to the US than those free from such problems. In the same 
vein, Bricongne et al. (2012) find that the exports of French firms being more 
dependent on external funds were more adversely hit during the recent global crisis. 
Finally, Berman et al. (2013) found that the fall in trade caused by financial crises is 
more severe when one accounts for the required delays to ship goods abroad. 
Because risk of default rises with such delays, this aggregate and firm level evidence 
point to financial frictions that are exacerbated during a financial crisis.  
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In addition, Borensztein and Panizza (2010) highlight the effects of sovereign debt 
crises on trade flows. They use panel data of 24 countries and 28 industries over the 
period 1980-2000 and find that export-oriented industries are relatively more 
affected when a sovereign default occurs. But export firms tend to benefit from real 
depreciations, thus being less procyclical than domestically-oriented industries. 
Abiad et al. (2011a) conclude to incomplete recovery from systemic financial 
disruptions when output growth is not accompanied with a credit expansion. The 
persistent lack of external funds is responsible for a weaker and more protracted 
recovery than it would have been the case otherwise. The robustness of the results 
from the previous studies can be however questioned since they focus on a relatively 
short set of financial crises either in a small group of countries or over a narrow time 
period. On this ground, Cerra and Saxena (2008) have attempted an exhaustive of 
economic recoveries in a large set of 190 countries and given various financial and/or 
political crises over 1960-2001.  They estimate a dynamic panel data model in order 
to build various sets of impulse response functions (IRF) of output growth to a set of 
financial and political shocks. The impulse response functions reveal that situations 
of financial stress may have persistent negative effects on output. The long-run loss 
of GDP is the highest in the event of a systemic banking crisis (4 per cent) or twined 
currency and banking collapses (up to 5 per cent on average). Countries with a low 
level of income per capita are twice more exposed to a financial crisis than higher 
income level countries.  
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2.2. Channelling financial disturbances though trade  
 
Cavallo and Frankel (2008) find robust evidence that openness to trade reduces the 
vulnerability to crises. This is consistent with Martin and Rey’s (2006) main 
conclusion about the effect of trade globalization on the likelihood of financial 
crashes: emerging markets showing increased financial integration without increased 
trade openness are at higher risk to financial disruptions. Similarly, trade integration 
can lead to fewer sudden stops in capital inflows according to Edwards (2004), thus 
leading to fewer output losses in more open economies.  
The contrasting view, namely that trade propagates shocks, is presented by 
Abeysinghe and Forbes (2005). Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2010) point towards greater 
synchronisation of recession shocks in the presence of stronger trade ties. Haile and 
Pozo (2008) support this view in the case of currency crises. Feldkircher (2014) 
concludes from his empirical investigations that trade openness has amplified rather 
than mitigated the impact of the 2008 systemic banking crisis. His results suggest 
that the economic slump in the New Member States of the European Union has been 
fuelled essentially by the decline in their exports. Trade like non-trade barriers may 
have exacerbated durably the depressive impact of the systemic banking crisis on the 
real economy. All these empirical findings support the idea that the trade channel 
may act as transmitting stress globally. 
Given these opposite views, one may better understand the disappointing results of 
Rose and Spiegel (2012) as concerns the contribution of foreign trade to the 2008 
crisis. They specify international linkages in a macro-econometric model in order to 
identify the channels through which the US crisis might have spread its effects 
around the world. In particular, they find a negative relationship between export (or 
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trade) dependence to the US economy and the country’s exposure to financial 
disruptions. But the intensity of trade links does not help characterise to potential 
epicentres of the crisis.  
Economic developments in the vulnerable economy prior to a crisis matter. This 
seems also to be the case of pre-crisis growth in its trading partners. The dynamism 
of domestic activity is heavily dependent on the health of foreign demand. According 
to Tsangarides (2012), a 1 per cent increase in the growth rate of foreign output 
implies a 2 per cent rise in GDP growth at home. Thus, international trade can foster 
the economic recovery in countries facing a currency crisis since foreign demand 
acts as a pull factor to domestic activity. 
The trade channel may also interact with the choice for the currency regime to 
influence the dynamics leading to the crisis. It can do so by influencing private 
expectations, thus magnifying financial vulnerability when credibility on the 
authorities’ commitment to the exchange rate parity vanishes. The currency regime 
may also influence the path to recovery because adjustment in the real exchange rate 
may be needed to improve price competitiveness in the export sector. Higher growth 
in tradable goods can foster output recovery. That said, there is still unconvincing 
empirical relevance about such a positive contribution of exchange rate flexibility 
during crisis times. On one hand, Tsangarides (2012) questions the stabilizing role of 
currency pegs compared with the performance of floating exchange rates during and 
following the Second Great Financial Crisis. Using a sample of fifty emerging 
market economies, he concludes to the limited role played by the exchange rate 
policy on macroeconomic performance during the crisis years (2007-2009). By 
contrast, the recovery has been worse for peggers than for floaters. However, 
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Bussière et al. (2012) remain skeptical about any influence of exchange rate 
flexibility during the adjustment to a currency collapse.  
 
 
II. An extension to the Cerra-Saxena impulse response function approach 
 
The econometric approach is built to assess the impact of financial crises on potential 
output. To this end, we adapt the now popular method developed by Cerra and 
Saxena (2005, 2008). It has led to many empirical studies on the medium- to long-
run consequences of currency, banking and/or sovereign debt crises by Abiad et al. 
(2011a, 2011b, 2013), Jorda et al. (2012), Bussière et al. (2012), Furceri and 
Mourougane (2012), Furceri and Zidzienicka (2012).  
However, we depart from their original procedure in two important respects. First, 
we relax the rather strong assumption that imposes a uniform response of output 
growth in all the countries belonging to the same geographical region or sharing the 
same level of development to a crisis event. Such a common behaviour stems from 
the panel data model initially developed by Cerra and Saxena (2005). Instead, we 
allow all the slope parameters to differ from one country to another. Accounting for 
this potential source of heterogeneity allows for cross-country comparisons. 
Differences between distinct areas can then be studied through aggregation of state-
level impulses responses. 
Second, we account explicitly for the fact that, once a shock occurred, the response 
of output growth in one country may spill over to its neighbours as a by-product of 
international trade linkages. By doing so, one is able to assess the importance of 
second round effects. Those may reflect the transmission of a shock due to strong 
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dependencies across countries, as it could be during tranquil periods, and/or 
contagion in case of a financial crisis (Forbes, 2013). 
Given these new features, our econometric methodology is made of two important 
steps. First of all, we estimate a univariate autoregressive growth equation and derive 
the relative impulse response functions: 
 !!,! = !! + !!! + !!,! !!,!!!!!!! + !!,!!!,!!!!"#$%&#'!!!! + !!,!!!,!!!!!!! + !!,!   (1) 
 
Like Cerra and Saxena (2008), we define !!,! as the growth rate of the industrial 
production index in month t in country i (used as a proxy of domestic activity). Di,t-r 
is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 at the crisis event or a financial crisis in 
country i in month t-r, and 0 otherwise. We also follow past studies by setting the 
maximum lag order to 4 (months here). The constant term αi corresponds to the fixed 
effect specific to country i, while t is a deterministic trend.  
A first original feature here is that the direct influence of the financial crisis on the 
output dynamics – given by the δi,r parameters in Equation (1) r months ahead in 
country i – may vary from one economy to another. This is a less stringent condition 
than the one imposed initially by Cerra and Saxena (2005, 2008). 
The second novelty from formula (1) is the explicit account of a possible 
transmission channel of the financial crisis through the output growth of country’s i 
trading partners. This indirect effect is captured through the sequence of terms !!,!!!!"#$%&#' for country i up to four months in the past from the current month t. The 
variable !!,!!!!"#$%&#' is the sum of growth rates weighted by export shares. For any 
given month t and any country i, we then define an additional set of macro-economic 
identities as: 
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   !!,!!"#$%&#' ≡ !!,!,!!!,!!!!!!!!             (2) 
 
N is the total number of countries in the sample. The weight coefficients ωi,k,t 
measure the share of trade of country i with its partner k in the total foreign trade of 
country i in month t. Adding this term into the regression Equation (1) has severe 
implications since the error terms ui,t are likely to be correlated. We rely on the 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimator (SURE) to deal with the endogeneity 
issue in the system resulting from Equation (1).  
Next, we build IRF to two kinds of shocks. The first one is an adverse demand shock 
specific to a given country i that materializes in a (minus) one-standard deviation 
realization of the error term ui,t. The second one corresponds to the Global Financial 
Crisis in 2008. We follow Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) by assuming that all 
countries in our sample were hit by that systemic banking crisis. There is however no 
consensus about the dating of this big financial crisis since the Lehman Brothers’ 
failure occurred several months after speculative pressures surged on the US 
subprime market. We thus assume that each crisis dummy Di takes the value one for 
every months of year 2008. This is in line with previous studies based on annual data 
like Cerra and Saxena (2008). 
The shape of these response functions in country i depends on the set of the 
estimated λi, βi, and δi coefficients in Equation (1). These are the coefficients 
associated with the trend, the lagged values of potential output growth and those of 
the financial crisis dummy, respectively. To get a 95% confidence interval, we run 
5,000 Monte Carlo simulations under each scenario using critical values from the 
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standard Gaussian limiting distribution. It is illustrated by the dashed lines around the 
mean (cumulative) response in Figures 1 to 4 in the appendix.  
The resulting system from Equation (1) is estimated on a balanced panel of monthly 
OECD data from 1993:01 to 2013:06. Due to limited data availability on monthly 
bilateral trade relationships, our sample covers 26 OECD and non-OECD economies, 
including: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium (together with Luxemburg), 
Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. As said above, we wish 
to make comparisons between countries given their geographical situations and their 
degrees of development. Because we focus on the role played by the intensity of 
cross-country trade linkages, we also wish to assess the influence of the regional 
trade and/or monetary agreements on the output responses to negative shocks, 
originating either over the business cycle or from distress in the banking system. To 
our knowledge, such an appraisal is new to the literature. 
 
III. The mixed impact of international trade during the 2008 crisis 
 
Domestic shocks and international trade relationships  
 
Impulse-response functions of a 1% demand shock in a country i are simulated 
according to two scenarios. In the first one, trade spillover effects are disregarded so 
that the !!,!!!!"#$%&#' variables do not appear in Equation (1) above. In other terms, all 
the parameters γ i,q  are set to 0 (there is no trade effects). It corresponds to our 
benchmark case similar to the one initially considered by Cerra and Saxena (2005, 
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2008). In the second situation, we account explicitly for trade spillover effects 
through the γi,q parameters in the Equation (1).  
Table 1 gives the cumulative impact of a negative demand shock 18 months after its 
occurrence in both scenarios. The last column shows that trade magnifies the effects 
of shocks from 1.3% (for a shock in Australia) to 700% (for a shock in Germany). 
Trade effects are higher when the shock hits a large country: it amounts to roughly 
520% in the United States and 330% in France while it is only 7% in Norway and 
10% in Greece (Australia is however an exception). The corresponding Figure 1 in 
the appendix depicts the whole path of the weighted average output growth in 
various areas. 
Table 1 shows a strong and positive relationship between openness and contagion 
effects: spillover effects after a demand shock are larger for the main exporting 
countries. This result is consistent with Abeysinghe and Forbes (2005).  The effect 
captured also encompasses the policy reaction triggered by the crisis and its 
consequences on the real economy. However, it is not easy to disentangle the pure 
crisis effect from the policy response, given the absence of a counterfactual. 
Considering now the trade channel, the time-path of the cumulative impact of a 
domestic demand shock on economic growth is illustrated in Figure 2 (in appendix). 
Unlike the Figure 1, IRF reported in Figure 2 are computed from Equation 1 with the 
inclusion of the !!,!!!!"#$%&#' terms under a set of constraints given by the corresponding 
foreign growth identities. The corresponding graphs show that the advanced 
economies in our sample behave quite differently from the emerging market 
economies. In this latter group, the cumulative response of output to a negative 
demand shock is significantly negative during the first three months only. By 
contrast, output loss is more persistent in the advanced countries.   
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Table 1. Cumulated responses of output growth to a negative domestic demand 
shock during tranquil times (18 month horizon) 
 
Country      Without trade, in %  (1) 
With trade, in % 
(2) 
Trade effect, in % 
(2)/(1) 
Argentina -3.4 -4.0 16.0 
Australia -1.3 -1.3 1.4 
Austria -0.7 -1.4 104.9 
Belgium-Luxemburg -0.8 -2.6 230.1 
Canada -0.8 -2.2 188.7 
Czech Republic -1.2 -2.1 80.4 
Denmark -1.3 -1.9 43.3 
Finland -1.0 -1.5 41.3 
France -0.4 -1.8 328.3 
Germany -0.7 -5.3 698.5 
Greece -1.0 -1.1 9.5 
Hungary -0.9 -1.6 74.1 
Ireland -2.3 -3.2 41.2 
Italia -0.7 -2.4 241.1 
Japan -1.4 -4.0 185.4 
Mexico -0.9 -2.0 111.5 
Netherlands -1.0 -2.7 184.0 
Norway -1.1 -1.2 7.1 
Poland -1.4 -2.5 80.6 
Portugal -1.0 -1.3 26.1 
Spain -0.7 -1.5 133.3 
Sweden -0.9 -1.7 91.8 
Turkey -1.9 -3.2 72.4 
United Kingdom -0.4 -1.0 153.1 
United States -0.6 -3.6 522.1 
 
Figure 2 also reveals differences among currency and trade unions. The 
instantaneous impact is the strongest for the euro area, but the cumulative output loss 
is the highest within NAFTA at a longer (18-month) horizon. In comparison with 
Figure 1, a negative demand shock has a deeper impact on industrial production 
when trade relationships are accounted for. This is particularly the case for the euro 
area. 
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The 2008 Global Financial Crisis and trade spillovers 
 
In order to replicate the 2008 financial crisis, we simulate a systemic banking crisis: 
all countries are affected by a banking crisis during one year. The methodology is the 
same as before: IRF to a banking crisis are simulated i) without trade contagion that 
is as if exports of the country i were null and ii) with trade contagion so that IRF take 
into account the reaction of output growth abroad through the set of variables !!,!!!!"#$%&#'.  
Like Table 1, Table 2 below reports the total impact on output growth at the country 
level 18 months after the worldwide systemic event occurred. Figures 3 and 4 in the 
appendix illustrate the whole trajectories over this horizon whether spillover effects 
through international trade are taken into account or not.  
In the first column of Table 2, most of countries tend to react negatively to a banking 
crisis. If these countries are allowed to exports, the multipliers tend to decrease in 
absolute value (column 2). In this case, trade dampens the negative effects of a 
banking crisis. Countries that react positively to the banking crisis (Australia, 
Canada, Ireland, Norway, Poland and the United States) have lower multipliers when 
they are allowed to exports. Again, trade dampens the effects of a systemic banking 
crisis. The only exception is Poland. The unusual post-crisis macroeconomic 
performance of Poland is well documented (OECD, 2012 and Sobják, 2013). 
Poland’s economic growth was much less harmed by the Great Financial Crisis given 
its low degree of openness to trade, its high trade diversification, the sustained 
growth of domestic consumption and public investment. All these specific factors 
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may explain the positive impact of trade in the Polish economy during the aftermath 
of the 2008 crisis. 
Table 2. Cumulated responses of output growth to the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis (18 month horizon) 
 
Country      Without trade, in % (1) 
With trade, in % 
(2) 
Trade effect, in % 
(2)/(1) 
Argentina -9.4 -2.9 -69.5 
Australia 0.7 -2.8 -480.6 
Austria -7.6 -0.5 -93.6 
Belgium-Luxemburg -11.9 -8.2 -30.7 
Canada 0.4 -0.3 -172.3 
Czech Republic -14.5 -6.4 -55.9 
Denmark -5.2 0.1 -101.6 
Finland -23.3 0.2 -100.7 
France -9.0 -1.3 -85.9 
Germany -17.3 -4.9 -71.5 
Greece -3.2 -3.3 1.1 
Hungary -17.9 -5.5 -68.9 
Ireland 4.1 -1.5 -136.1 
Italia -19.7 -2.6 -86.8 
Japan -22.8 -1.3 -94.2 
Mexico -17.1 -0.3 -97.9 
Netherlands -12.6 -4.5 -64.3 
Norway 8.0 6.2 -21.9 
Poland 3.2 5.1 59.5 
Portugal -3.3 -1.2 -64.7 
Spain -12.0 -2.5 -79.3 
Sweden -11.3 -1.5 -86.4 
Turkey -8.0 -7.4 -7.0 
United Kingdom -1.6 0.0 -97.2 
United States 1.7 -0.4 -125.8 
 
Another interesting feature concerns the influence of regional integration and the 
stage of development of the countries under study. This is illustrated in Table 3 (see 
also Fig. 1 to 4 for the corresponding dynamics). We consider three distinct 
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economic regions of the world1: the euro area with all its founding Member States 
(including Greece), the 6 remaining Members States of the European Union which 
have not joined the euro yet, and the 3 countries participating to the North American 
Free Trade Area. We also distinguish the impact of trade between two groups of 
advanced and developing countries according to the World Bank classification. 
 
Table 3. Regional patterns of trade spillover effects on output growth given type 
of shock (weighted average of countries responses by their GDP shares) 
Country group Demand shock 
 
2008 Global Crisis 
World-26 260.2 -75.2 
       Euro-12    292.1 -69.9 
       Others EU-7 252.6 -59.7 
       NAFTA-3    433.7 -126.8 
       Rest of World-4    109.1 -130.1 
   Advanced-19 316.7 -125.4 
Developing-7 63.0 -38.9 
"
Table 3 shows significant heterogeneity in the trade spillover effect on output growth 
across regional trade agreements. Its magnitude varies from 1 to 4 times in the case 
of a domestic shock when there is no financial crisis (see column 2). By contrast, 
there is less variability following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (see column 3).  
The level of per capita GDP has a strong influence on the magnitude of the output 
growth response to a domestic shock during tranquil (or non-crisis) periods. The 
trade multiplying effect is 5 times greater in the group of advanced countries than in 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
1"Euro-12: Germany, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal. Others EU-7: Denmark, Hungary, Norway, 
Poland, United Kingdom, Sweden, Czech Republic. NAFTA-3: Canada, Mexico, 
USA. Rest of World-4: Australia, Japan, Turkey, Argentina. Developing-7: Greece, 
Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Czech-Republic, Turkey, Argentina."
18"
"
the developing world. Instead, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis shows no sign of 
such discrepancies. This is broadly consistent with the better resilience of the 
developing economies to the systemic banking crisis that originated in the US (see 
Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012, among others). When comparing Figure 3 with 
Figure 4, the absence of a trade collapse would have helped to mitigate the recession 
following the 2008 crisis. This is particularly the case in the euro area and the 
emerging economies, while the trade channel is less convincing within NAFTA.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Using the methodology of Cerra and Saxena (2008), we simulate the impact of the 
2008 banking crisis on growth developments for 26 countries from 1996 to 2013. 
However, Cerra and Saxena do not take into account globalization effects. In this 
paper, we integrate trade relationships in order to decompose between directs effects 
from shocks and indirect effects from trade. Trade contagion is simulated in the 
context of, first a demand shock and then of systemic banking crisis. Trade contagion 
is important in both cases. But, with a demand shock, contagion effects of trade are 
positive and correlated with the size and the openness of the country. Results are in 
line in those of Abeysinghe and Forbes (2005). However, according to Edwards 
(2004), Martin and Rey (2006) and Cavallo and Frankel (2008), trade globalization 
reduces effects of financial crisis.  
Finally, our results show that trade contributes more to extend demand shock (260% 
in average) than to reduce financial crisis (-75%). 
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Fig. 1. Cumulative mean impulse response of output growth to a domestic 
demand shock without trade spillovers (95% confidence band) 
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Fig. 2. Cumulative mean impulse response of output growth to a domestic 
demand shock with trade spillovers (95% confidence band) 
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Fig. 3. Cumulative mean impulse response of output growth to the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis without trade spillovers (95% confidence band) 
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Fig. 4. Cumulative mean impulse response of output growth to the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis with trade spillovers (95% confidence band) 
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